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TRANSFORMING THE FORCE AND LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION U. S. Army transformation strategy addresses the imperative to change the Army from a
Cold War oriented design to one that is more responsive, agile and adaptable to present and emerging threats across the spectrum of conflict. Transforming logistics and support for the force is an essential part of the transformation effort. This paper examines the short history of U. S. Army transformation and associated logistics transformation goals, objectives, programs and enablers that have emerged from the transformation initiative. Although many improvements may apply to other sectors of the Army and Joint force, the scope of this paper is focused on Army CSS elements. It also covers the effects of recent conflict experience on transformation efforts. As the force transforms, is the current logistics transformation focus on the right attributes, or should attention and innovation also be made in other areas, such as training or improving lethality in logistics units?
Transformation Setting: Recent History
Prior to 1999, senior Army leaders had recognized the need and the opportunity for change from a cold-war era force. With no peer competitor, a window of opportunity for change appeared on a large scale. The foremost questions in the defense community were, what threats will the Army need to be prepared to engage, and how quickly and adequately can we respond? The Army penchant for assessing employment performance in operations captured valuable insights in Desert Storm, Somalia, Haiti and Kosovo. It primarily highlighted that it took a long time to put an effective heavy force on the ground, wasn't agile in transportability, could be too heavy for the area of operations infrastructure, and much time and effort had to be made to adequately sustain it (creating a large transportation requirement and logistics footprint in the area of operations). The media acted as an additional catalyst, magnifying and graphically portraying military operational deficiencies and successes in near-or real-time. This was viewed as an ideal time to introduce wholesale change to ensure our Army could successfully engage threats across the spectrum of conflict, before change would be forced upon us through learned failure at the hands of an unrealized but lurking threat. It also brought two elements increasingly to the forefront that made transformational change more imperative. Firstly, although the word "globalization" had not been created, it was easy to see that events occurring across the globe, sometimes in unfamiliar places, had impact on other nations and persons. 1 This global "interdependence" aspect of globalization was coming to the fore and highlighted the need for swift and effective military action, as demonstrated in crises in Kuwait, Bosnia and Kosovo. 2 Another aspect that made Army transformation more imperative was the rapidly accelerating rate of technological capability, particularly in communications (radio, television, video, and most importantly, the internet). 3 Breathtaking leaps in technological innovation and improvements were occurring, with network-enhanced capabilities and numerous enablers that held much promise for the Army to perhaps meet the goals to be better, faster, smarter, and hopefully smaller, reducing its support requirements and forward footprint. With the absence of an obvious major conflict on the horizon, there was no better time to make sweeping changes for a better future force.
Transforming the Force-1999 Forward "If you don't like change, you're going to like irrelevance a lot less."
-attributed to GEN Shinseki
In the fall of 1999, then-Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Eric Shinseki boldly pushed the US Army into a comprehensive transformation effort. Although some important work had been done to previously to "turn concepts into capabilities", notably Force XXI and the Army After
Next initiatives, the entire Army was not impacted nor was there a feeling of having a stake in its efforts. 4 With the advent of a publicly advertised campaign to change the Army, GEN Shinseki articulated a vision and committed all elements of the Army to a program of change. The overall goal was to shape the Army "…to meet the requirements of the next century…: Soldiers on point for the Nation transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations. The TCP was expected to change as organizations attained better granularity on programs and conceptual goals, and as new capabilities emerged. However, to get quality, updated input across the Army was challenging. To ensure organizations understood the importance of this input, TCP changes and new input were reviewed by the VCSA, initially twice weekly, with general officers in attendance representing each line of operation in the TCP briefing the changes. It was made known that the CSA personally reviewed a bi-weekly updated plan, and met with the Chief, Army Transformation Office and/or the VCSA often. The plan highlighted critical activity with green/amber/red coding for goals, objectives, and milestones and was updated frequently; changes were also highlighted, and eventually, and most importantly, programs within the POM cycle were tied to resourcing. These days, any reader of military transformation in the can easily see that military transformation concepts are nested. 8 To put logistics transformation in context, concepts are nested in the overall Army transformation plan. It is important to note that current work on establishing a single seamless logistics system that can work in a joint, interagency, and multinational partner environment is not new. Modularity, distribution based logistics, and improved asset visibility, in fact much of the change the Army logistics community has sought under the transformation banner has been in the works for several years prior to the 2000 effort to formalize change (for several references see TRADOC PAM 525-70's series). 9 The difference is the catalyst for implementing change: the Army Transformation Campaign Plan provided a better way to get visibility and support for programs that contribute directly to transformation.
The overarching logistics transformation goals were specific and significant: make the force more deployable, agile and reduce the battlespace footprint. However, it was, and is, difficult to translate with metrics how badly needed technological improvements in logistics processes will reduce the logistics "burden", and by what date reductions will be achieved. The benefit was to show relevance of these enablers to provide an overall capability in the plan, and in doing this, it gave logistics initiatives new visibility and importance. The Army needed to improve strategic responsiveness by emplacing a "combat capable brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours" after wheels up, a division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. 10 The
Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) was already concentrating on structural and strategic lift improvements, so the dictum to find ways to get the force to deploy faster provided additional momentum. It brought new life to the discussions of high speed sea lift and other enablers, and support for additional funding of the USAF's C17s and the US Navy's roll-on/roll-off and other ship programs. Another goal was to adopt best business practices to improve support to the force, which was targeted primarily at improvements at the wholesale logistics level. 11 The
Revolution in Military Logistics effort begun under former CSA GEN Reimer gave the logistics community a bit of a head start on improving sustainment. Leveraging the network to create a seamless logistics system with right-sized stockage levels was envisioned as the way ahead to make logistics support to the force more agile, although it was easier to articulate than to effect. 12 There were several programs utilizing the internet to attain asset visibility but these were not linked, and decisions on who could view the data kept much of the utility hidden. were to enhance strategic responsiveness, reduce logistics costs, and reduce logistics in the battlespace footprint. 23 Experience in OEF and particularly in OIF amended logistics transformation to "enhance our current capabilities while transforming Army logistics for tomorrow", keeping aligned with the Army approach to transforming the force as it continues to provide the best capabilities for the force currently in conflict areas. 24 Simply put, "Our number one priority is making sure Soldiers get what they need in order to fight and win." 25 "To sustain combat power, we must have the ability to "see" requirements ondemand through a logistics information network. We must develop a responsive distribution system enabled by in-transit and total asset visibility and managed by a single owner who has positive end-to-end control in the theater. The Army needs a robust, modular force-reception capability -a dedicated and trained organization able to quickly open a theater and support flexible, continuous sustainment throughout the joint operations area. Lastly, we need an integrated supply chain with a single proponent who can leverage all resources in a joint, interagency and multinational theater….If we do not connect Army logisticians, improve the capability of the distribution system, modernize force reception, and provide integrated supply management, we will study these same lessons after the next major conflict.
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"Connecting Army Logisticians " recognizes the importance of building an automated logistics requisition, visibility and communication system to reach a larger logistics transformation goal: establishing a distribution-based supply system on a non-linear, noncontiguous battlefield. 27 During OIF, even the best trained units could not electronically "blast"
requisitions successfully due to extended distances and inadequate communications capability, and there was little capability to gain materiel asset visibility. 28 To remedy this, four tasks were where sources of supply are. This capability is operating in deployed units now.
The second task, "Implement MTS" highlights a visibility capability that operated with great success during combat operations in OIF. It was sparsely and hurriedly fielded and had some communications restrictions as it is a non-secure system, but was the single best logistics communications tool that the Forward Support Battalions (now BSBs) and a few other logistics units had during the war. 31 MTS "provides crucial visibility on materiel and distribution in theater…" and is "…a vital link in ensuring the Army consistently delivers in-transit visibility, controls logistics assets, and performs vital distribution management functions worldwide." 32 The distribution goal is to provide "…one MTS in every five tactical distribution vehicles, one in Task #4, upgrading SARSS with radio frequency identification (RFID) provides logisticians the tools to read and write RFID tags for item receipt and release. RFID helps provide an answer to the ageless Army question of "where's my stuff", and potentially gives visibility to logisticians at all levels to account where items are during transit to its intended destination. This capability existed before current operations but had limited distribution prior to
OIF. This will greatly assist in achieving better clarity on materiel location and help minimize unit re-ordering.
One recent discovery of modular design implementation, which will be discussed later in this paper, is that re-tooling support units for better automation capability is essential in order to "see, account for and control the thousands of equipment changes to build and fight the Modular Army". 40 Upgrades and tear on vehicle hinges, frames and chassis, and exposed needed improvements in force protection, which is also translated into additional costs.
Another area that has plagued US ground forces for years is the ability to receive the force in the area of operations and establish sustainment support. Past experience has had operational units open and operate ports of embarkation, most recently in OIF, and execute support functions until adequate CSS power is on the ground to take over. This mission is a distraction and drain on elements that should be oriented on establishing operations in theater.
To Improve Force Reception , a Theater Support Command (TSC) with sustainment brigades that will have theater opening capability is the proposed fix; ultimately, the TSC is envisioned to be the controller of all ground personnel reception and logistics assets flowing into theater, with total visibility of logistics, from all sources to the units. 43 Sustainment brigades are being designed in view of the modular design that is being applied at the BCT level. The brigades will "…move rapidly into an area of responsibility and immediately receive joint and coalition forces deploying into that area. It can provide life support, port clearance, force protection, communications, and initial distribution for forces arriving into theater." 44 This is an important change to the present logistics array of units, as it begins to establish in-theater logistics unity of effort in the TSC with in-theater CSS assets. 45 As modularity is applied to the TSC's Sustainment BDE designs, the reconfiguration of Army Pre-positioned Stocks (Afloat) into Army
Regional Flotillas (ARF) dovetails with this change:
"At the core of each of the flotillas are two large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships. One of these ships contains a maneuver brigade task force set of equipment. This ship will deliver the capability of one armored and one mechanized infantry battalion, a package of brigade combat support and combat service support capabilities, and 15 days of supplies. The second of these ships will contain equipment for units echeloned above brigade. A third vessel in the flotilla, a roll-on/roll-off ship with a shallow draft, will provide the capability to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. Finally, each flotilla will include a fourth ship with sustainment stocks and a fifth vessel will be loaded with ammunition. The current requirement calls for these last two ships to carry sufficient supplies for 2.5 present-day divisions for 30 days, but the Army is reviewing the mix of commodities to best support its forces under modularization." 46 Clearly, the effect of modularizing logistics units above the BCT level to better task organize for opening and establishing a theater coupled with the ARF's improved logistics responsiveness and flexibility, and will enable regional commanders to more rapidly establish a combat power presence wherever needed. It may reduce the battlespace footprint as well, but this remains to be validated.
The fourth capability the logistics community seeks is to effectively support the Soldier by Integrating the Supply Chain . The methodology for improvement is by establishing four capabilities:
-constant, total asset visibility from the initial order to the asset provider to the requestor;
-integrating processes and information systems architecture by using the best available software to facilitate better logistics delivery, accuracy, and visibility;
-utilize best business practices to enhance and measure improvements in supply chain management, and ensure the best type support for the best performance of weapons systems and equipment; and -create a seamless linkage to integrate vendors, logistics agencies, and requesting elements to create more proactive support to the Soldier, allowing the vendors and government re-supply entities to anticipate shortages via access to Army asset visibility.
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All of these programs are either desired or emerging attributes to better support the force. Aggressive efforts are being made now to better connect the Army logistician. 48 Transforming Support for the Force: Modularity and ARFORGEN Implementation
Another part of Army logistics transformation that is currently being planned and has a huge impact on the lives and careers of CSS Soldiers is modularizing Army CSS force structure. This is probably because much of the work on CSS force structure re-design has not been formally approved, although this concept, to create a more responsive, agile, deployable force to better fit combatant commander requirements, has been underway for years with varying degrees of attention and effort. 49 As the first CSS unit type to undergo re-design in the operational context of a non-linear, non-contiguous 360° battlespace, the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) is replacing the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) and is now an integral and essential part of the BCT. The BSB has more robust support capabilities that migrated from the elimination of the Main Support Battalion, notably in increased transport and organic water production. The FSB had single function companies and now has multi-functional companies employed with BCT battalion task force elements when deployed. The BSB has been employed, tested and deployed to OIF. Whether this is a workable design under combat conditions as experienced in the first 30 days of war, which is not the same environment in present-day Iraq, remains to be seen.
As previously discussed, the BSB is being fielded with new enablers to provide the BCT with improved support capability; with VSAT, more MTS fielding and BSC3, the BSB should have improved requisitioning capability and asset visibility. It is also being provided with an increased force protection capability to enable it to support the BCT via the distribution based support concept. Increased lethality and survivability for the FSB has been sorely needed; this is being done by fielding the BSB more weapons systems and vehicle protection. As the BSB is now officially part of the BCT, it will also be part of BCT resourcing considerations for training, which will hopefully improve training planning, resourcing and Soldier/unit field skills.
Modularity will hopefully provide improved agility and capability to all support elements.
However, a concern is the time it will take to execute CSS modular re-design, and the financial and training resourcing it will take to make these CSS modularized assets capable to exercise distribution-based logistics. The competing costs of improving a force while it is at war may slow the rate of conversion. The Long War is a costly endeavor, even without transformation , that increase in dependence would represent an additional 18,000 to 19,000 reserve personnel who would have to be mobilized and deployed for a major combat operation.
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Transforming Support: Add Focus on Improving CSS Lethality
Resourcing logistics transformation, or innovation, is a continual struggle. It is difficult to contemplate adding more requirements to a long list of improvements requiring fiscal support.
However, it appears the Army has harvested generally the same lessons from OIF/OEF that have been learned in Desert Shield/Storm: improve visibility, speed, distribution, and reduce logistics in the battlespace wherever possible. What has not been recognized is the deficit in CSS lethality capability in a changed battlespace. Modularity has brought an expectation and reality that units will provide their own force protection, whether in convoy/movement or in a stationary footprint. What has not been thought through and provided to the CSS community with some teeth for the "tooth." There is a need to provide CSS units the capability to identify, intercept and kill immediate, small element threats to dissuade further action. As of this writing, some CSS units, primarily the support elements in the BCT, have been given added weapons capability and more armoring. This is not the same as adding a lethal capability to the CSS force structure. All CSS units need a designed, integral capability added to each formation that is manned and equipped to provide aggressive force protection in addition to its manning and equipping for its support mission. These should be CSS MOS Soldiers but have a designated lethality section added to each CSS formation, not add on an additional mission to CSS elements. This is necessary to provide the actual capability of enhanced unit lethality: Soldiers will not just think it is another additional mission they must do in addition to carrying out their individual force protection and occupational specialty. Soldiers across the Army have the warrior ethos; but in CSS formations they should be given the capability for applying defensive force.
CSS formations should have the capability to pursue or interdict attacks to mitigate further aggressive threat attempts. This lethality capability should be developed by applying the doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF). Currently, changes are being made with only part of the DOTLMPF being thought through. This is particularly evident in our reserve CSS formations, but is glaring at any level above the BCT. There is also a prevalent mindset that the changes being made to the CSS formations are for the problems occurring in the current battlespace. During the execution of the war in Iraq, it was clear that CSS units need and must develop the capability to handle threats and protect its force. Although attacks on convoys, not perimeters were the usual threat, in any wartime environment CSS units need the lethal capability to deter attacks, and interdict and defeat them when required. During OIF, unless units were augmented with military police, air defense augmentation, or other heavily armed elements, there was little in CSS formations to accomplish these tasks. Presently, there is no doctrinal assurance or expectation that CSS units will have a lethal capability, or that failing the receipt of those improvements, that units will be augmented with other force protection. Lethality augmentation that is available for OIF rotations will not be available if there is a quick call to war.
The Army's most vulnerable part of the force on the battlefield is its CSS formations. This is not due to any lack in our Soldiers' attitudes or individual fighting capabilities. It is a deficit in applying lethality in a more aggressive form, and as a concept and capability, to the As the Cold War ended, the Army anticipated its need to transform to meet the emerging threats of the 21 st Century. Before 9-11, the Army was already on a course to realize its transformation, but at a very deliberate pace and in a much more constrained resource environment. At the time, the Army was forced to assume risk to the current force in order to execute our transformation. One example of where we assumed risk was in force protection and offensive requirements for our combat support and combat service support units. In the past, our doctrine called for these units to operate in "rear areas" where threats were historically minimal. This doctrine led to a resource strategy in some cases where combat support or combat service support units would have less modern equipment in fewer quantities so that the combat formations could have full amounts of the latest technology. In today's contemporary operating environment (COE), support can no longer be viewed as a free, continuous, and secure function. In many types of operations, support is at risk as much as maneuver, with maneuver units having an effective duration that will expire if support is not re-established….Hence, there is a definite necessity to resource basic Soldier skills training to ensure that the logistician Soldiers and leaders are competent in combat skills of convoy defense, patrolling and perimeter defense, and the use of the most up-to-date enabling technology to integrate the force protection and technical sustainment functions into overall tactical-level sustainment operations within logistical units. changes that must be made, and these improvements will have strategic as well as operational and tactical impacts. Although there is progress within each of these areas, competition for adequate funding will determine when and if these goals come to fruition. Historically, anecdotal evidence indicates that logistics improvements have not been viewed as having the cachet to draw adequate funding unless the capability resides in a powerful Congressional district or until disaster occurs to highlight the requirement. Identifiable improvements in weaponry appear to get the funding over seemingly dry, more bureaucratic improvements.
The Army must rapidly decide on CSS force structure design . The CSS final modular support structures have not been cast, although it has been roughly two years since the first modular BCT was established. How ARFORGEN will work with CSS unit design-or if ARFORGEN will work with the demands of our current CSS operational tempo--remains to be seen. CSS units are required to deploy on the same rotational turnover schedule as the BCTs but most of Army CSS is in the reserves and by the ARFORGEN design, has a different rotational timeline. Many reserve units are not manned or equipped for employment, although this area is being worked. Presently, the CSS community has Soldiers that are able to acquire an understanding of the Army's logistics system on the battlefield as they grow as leaders by accumulating experience at all levels of support, from within the BCT to theater support levels.
Assigning active duty soldiers to one or a few logistics units or geographical location will provide the Soldier and family members with improved stability and predictability-but may not create as knowledgeable and versatile soldier as we presently have in the CSS community.
Recommend the Army add a focus area on improving CSS lethality. CSS formations require more than additional weapons and force protection equipment; lethality must be a CSS capability resident in the unit force structure and trained to standard across the active and reserve force in order to provide an agile, capable and lethal delivery of support regardless of the nature of the operational environment. Improvements on CSS unit lethality capability should be applied through examination and application of the DOTLMPF and have a resident lethal capability established in each unit, like the military police augmentation some CSS units had during OIF. 58 Support elements have serious deficits this area and require major holistic improvements in associated CSS education, equipping, and training. CSS units executing battlefield supply distribution in a non-linear, non-contiguous 360° battlespace are vulnerable, lucrative targets. With the geographical dispersion of forces, CSS units must have the capability to defend, but also be visibly and materially capable to deter enemy attacks, and to pursue when the situation is ripe for more aggressive action. CSS soldiers want to be empowered to successfully execute missions and have the capability to apply some lethal effect on the enemy when threatened. As mentioned previously, historically the Army was able to take risk in CSS force structure in a linear, echeloned structure; the conflict paradigm has changed. Today's battlefield environment requires 360° force protection capability whether stationary or on the move. This is particularly critical in the Army National Guard and Reserve CSS elements, as these Soldiers get far less exposure to quality, standardized training due to geographic dispersion and limited time to focus on training, but are essential to supporting the force in any expeditionary operation.
If lethality is not accepted and applied as a capability to CSS units and delineated particularly in a lethality section that will provide interdictive and mitigating effects on the threat, CSS formations, particularly our reserve elements, could greatly benefit from:
• Communications upgrades across the board but particularly more comprehensive fielding of radios, NVGs, long line of sight capability to see first, FBCB2 or like item to see other elements on the battlefield, and heavy fielding of GPS devices.
• Couple this with hard training, a stair-step approach to individual training validation and then team competition in executing excellence in infantry standard basics of, for example, defending a perimeter. Although current convoy threats require lethal convoy formation action and/or other effects mitigation, we must not be lulled in focusing on today's challenges alone. A top down approach to understanding CSS needs in a fluid battlefield situation-particularly in perimeter defense-could save countless lives in the next conflict.
• Export and continue the current great training on CSS live fires and convoy actions.
Soldiers want to have confidence in individual and unit weapons, and this can only be achieved through maximum practice, training, and qualification. Waiting six months prior to deployment to do decent training is not getting ready for the "come as you are" emergency, or the "fight tonight".
• Exploit virtual, situational training scenarios and capabilities such as Janus and develop challenging lane training for home station implementation. This is especially critical for the majority of CSS units that receive no JRTC or NTC training, and especially for Reserve units.
• Establish and export mobile training teams (MTTs) validated by the Infantry Center that periodically evaluate and validate levels of unit readiness throughout the ARFORGEN time model. MTT members should be validated by demonstrating superior basic combat essential training and training techniques prior to evaluation duty.
• Virtual training on JANUS or other tools should be made available and maximized for CSS units above BCT level, as few CSS units get NTC or JRTC experience.
• One of the less expensive ways to improve education, training and lethality is to ensure CSS lessons learned and tips for improvised or virtual training are available for easy access and use. Web based education and training should be encouraged and exercised whenever possible. Recommend a "one stop shop" for CSS lessons learned and training techniques, much like the establishment of research sites in our senior service colleges. Designating CASCOM as the information center for CSS lessons learned could broker better information links with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and units with operational experiences to share. Presently, trying to extract information on CSS lessons learned from unit rotations on the CALL website, for example, takes far more work than it should if effort is applied to establishing a principal CSS training information web site with links. Many units have deployment experience in OIF/OEF now. With CSS unit rotations of three to six years gaps into hostile areas, we will lose these lessons learned without valuable training. Lessons learned from present and past conflicts, especially Vietnam, should be re-surfaced for easy retrieval. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is a terrific institution and has spent a great deal of money capturing lessons, but it does little good if Soldiers have to hunt through a myriad of documents to get information on such an important area that has applicability to a large part of the Army population.
The Army has learned some valuable insight since the inception of Army transformation as a force modernization effort in 1999 on what needs to change in our force to keep us relevant and ready. As identified in the Army G4 white paper, some very valuable desired attributes and tools have been identified to continue to enhance the CSS capability in getting the right stuff to the right place at the right time. However, the Army must fully recognize the force protection vulnerabilities of CSS units. Lethality must be recognized as a capability goal, and should join the company of the capability goals of connecting logisticians, modernizing supply distribution, improving force protection, and attaining an integrated supply chain. Soldiers in the CSS community and across the force are proven warriors; they will continue to be tested for some time to come. The lack of adequate CSS combat training and equipment for units does not mean CSS soldiers lack "warrior ethos." The surviving Soldiers of the on the 507 th Maintenance
Company ambush had warrior ethos in spades-at the time of the attack, they did not have the capability to defend themselves due to lack of equipment, training, or expectation (situational awareness) of the threat. Those soldiers gained a brutal life lesson and a bitter desire to engage with and kill the enemy. 59 CSS units must have the resident unit capability to apply lethal force to the threat when necessary to accomplish the support mission. 60 Send a message to the enemy-and transform the capabilities of CSS units to accomplish the support mission. Give CSS soldiers the capacity to adequately defend and deter threats by creating a doctrinal addition of lethality in its force structure that has been assessed through the DOTLMPF imperatives.
Endnotes 60 Author's note. See US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-19.1, Military Police Operations , 31 January 2002. Chapter 3 for discussion of threat levels. Threat levels 1 and II are described as: "Level 1: Agents, saboteurs, sympathizers and terrorists. These threats should be handled by unit, base, base cluster self defense measures…Level II: small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, guerillas, and bypassed enemy forces. These threats should be handled by selfdefense measures and response forces with supporting fires." Level III, the highest threat level category, refers to large tactical force elements which would require a tactical combat force to engage it. Although CSS units historically have been expected to handle levels I and II, as threat technological capabilities to deliver harm have increased for hostile elements, CSS unit improvements in lethality and force protection have been few until experiences in Iraq have forced improvements. Anecdotal evidence that has surfaced in discussions with former CSS battalion commanders that have served in Iraq: improvements were made piecemeal without thought of holistically improving the lethality of CSS units. There has been little follow-on action in this area in capturing lethality as a desired capability to be developed through the CSS units via DOTLMPF application.
